Zachonia broń pancerna na Ukrainie (wywiad)

Bardzo obszerny (samo przekopiowanie i obrobienie zajęło mi godzinę ^_^ ) wywiad z Ukraińskim specjalistą od broni pancernej.

Masa informacji na temat zastosowania i skuteczności poszczególnych typów broni, oprócz tego ogromna ilość wiedzy technicznej, historycznej, praktycznych doświadczeń z eksploatacji pojazdów na froncie, oraz z adaptowania sprzętu i taktyki do sytuacji, również dużo o taktyce i ekonomii wojny. Plus trochę rozmowy na temat przyszłości.

Skopiowałem tekst przetłumaczony na Angielski.
Tutaj oryginalny wywiad: https://mil.in.ua/uk/articles/interv-yu-z-mykoloyu-salamahoyu-pro-dosvid-zastosuvannya-zahidnoyi-bronetehniky-v-ukrayini/
Tu wywiad na YT: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZNEc7mUQSw

>Mykola Salamakha is an expert in the armored industry. We are going to talk about the use of armored vehicles in the war at it’s current stage and what is known so far. Let's start with western armor and its role in the war.

Let’s start with the tanks. We received different tanks from different countries. The main one is that we received Challenger 2 from the UK. They are fielded by air assault, now there is one company in a brigade.
The Challenger 2 is a sniper rifle - extremely powerful, with extremely serious protection. The tanks have well-trained crews who are absolutely delighted to have them. Given that among the crews there are those who trained for the T-80B tank and then retrained for the Challenger 2, they still say that it is heaven and earth. And that’s given the fact that the T-80B was top of the line at the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Only the T-80UD and T-80U were better, but there weren’t that many of them less than a 1000, unlike the proximately 6000 T-80B’s.
The difference is that the T-80B is about 20 years behind the Challenger 2. And this says it all. The power of ammunition, accuracy, reliability of systems, engine. This is what we couldn’t even dream of in Soviet times, and this is what we, unfortunately, did not attain in the times of independence.

>Do we use the “feared” DU shells?

Yes, they are being used. But you see, it is actually quite difficult to find a worthy opponent on the battlefield. Why? Because with 80-90% chance of first-hit-kill at a range of up to 4 km, first, we don't really have many ranges like that. And secondly, when the enemy realizes that they are facing air assault, and they know perfectly well which brigade has them in service (82nd), no one wants to expose themselves.
There is a second category of vehicles, the Leopard 2A4, in various versions. The first vehicles we received were from Norway. After that, some of them were received from other countries.
I'll give you an example that I always discuss with my colleagues. I got acquainted with a Norwegian Leopard 2A4 made in 1985, and back than it already had a thermal imager that still works today without any problems. In 1985, I was a senior lieutenant, as tank platoon commander, and then as a commander of training tank platoon, I did not even know this word - thermal imager. Here is the difference.
Again, yes, there were a lot of fears that the Leopard 2A4 was not sufficiently protected. This is not true. Why? If the Soviet Union and the Israelis used explosives as reactive armor (ERA), the Germans went the other way. They played with British technology (NERA). They tested its effectiveness with different materials and at different ranges and it’s no worse at protecting tanks compared to applique reactive armor such as Kontakt-1 or Kontakt-5. To give you an example, when the Soviet Union started to use NERA in T-72B’s turret armor, they copied the tech from the Germans, with the difference being that the Germans oriented it armor vertically, while the soviets decided that they were wiser, and placed it horizontally. This creates a situation where at certain angles, a shell can pass between the layers comparatively unimpeded. That’s the only reason this layout doesn’t work in soviet tanks.

Speaking of Leopard 1, it’s a very old machine. Not only is old technologically, engine is also weaker, but they have also been out of service for many years. That is, these tanks were decommissioned 30 years ago, 20 years ago. The most recent ones were decommissioned 15 years ago, and then they waited in various conditions for someone to find them and start repairing them and handing them over to Ukraine.
Unfortunately, there is such a phenomenon as metal aging, and the same goes for electronics and all radio devices. All this has led to the fact that we need to think very seriously about how to use these vehicles tactically, so that we do not lose them and, secondly, so that we do not endanger the crews of these vehicles. Although the Leopard 2A4s were smeared in Kontakt-1 and I think that now it is probably the Leopard 1’s turn to go through the same process.
And what is also very interesting is that the 105-mm gun, either the British L7 or the licensed German one, again under a British license, and the modern ammunition that has been developed for it, are much better than the 125-mm ammunition that was developed and produced by the Soviet Union and russia still produces. Why? When they screech about Svinets and Svinets-2, sure I’ve seen them on photos, but they weren’t in the ammo racks, but rather in boxes or on the ground. We’ve never actually seen them in captured machines.

>What about Leopard 2A6?

The Leopard 2A6 is an upgraded Leopard 2A5, and the latter is, in turn, an upgraded Leopard 2A4. This is another version of the improvement, the command controllability has improved, a much better panorama for the commander with his own thermal imager has been installed.
The Spaniards are now modernizing their Leopard 2A4s, installing a thermal imagers for the commander. The Germans have done this and it has enhanced the commander's ability to observe the battlefield, to detect targets, perhaps even earlier than the gunner can detect, at any time of the day. And the improvement of protection, those modular elements (the spaced “beak” on turret), they have significantly improved the armor protection. And we have already seen quite a few shots of Leopard 2A6 crews engaging in combat with even two enemy tanks and emerging victorious.

>Now that we are done with the into, I’d also like to ask about the wheeled tanks. Do they work in our conditions, do we need them and should develop something. I’m not asking about the AMX-10, since as we previously discussed, they aren’t really tanks, but rather recon vehicles. What is their future in conventional wars like ours?

Unfortunately, with wheeled tanks everything is limited by what is the maximum load on a wheel. In the tank has 6 wheels, it’s maximum weight will be in the range of 30 tons. With 8 wheels it will be 40 tons. To get reasonable protection in this weight category, with a 120 mm cannon and all the electronics behind the armor, one would have to sacrifice a lot of ammo capacity and would have to use an autoloader. A human loader takes up approximately 1/3 of all working space in a tank, since he has to turn 210° and to bend forward. It could be done like it was with the soviet tanks or have bustle autoloader like on Leclerc. Americans and Germans have experimented with them too. But I’m not sure if such a machine would be able to replace a tracked tank.

>You say that the Leopard 2A4, despite the initial distrust, still has good protection. Have there been any cases that could demonstrate this?

There was an incident with one of the brigades where our tankers were ambushed during an offensive. The enemy's T-62 tank company was very well hidden, and it was so camouflaged that even thermal imagers could not detect it - there were mats there, multi-layered. They fired 115-mm darts at our tanks from a distance of about 800 meters in the front of the turret - and the Leopard 2A4 withstood more than one hit. Some vehicles took 2 hits, some vehicles took 3 hits. Unfortunately, the attack had to be called off.

>How did the electronics, mechanisms and the crew survive the hits?

First, the electronics are absolutely adequate there, not the sort of stuff in commercial laptops. Also, absolutely everything is mechanically duplicated. There is a main sight with a thermal imaging channel and electronics, but there is also an additional so-called backup sight, which, according to its characteristics, has a 12x magnification or 8x magnification, but the quality of the optics is so good that it is absolutely no worse than the main sights on Soviet-made tanks. So there are no problems with this.
What pleasantly surprised me, was that we had always believed that the tracks of Western tanks equipped with rubber cushions, which we jokingly called the “asphalt caps”, are not made to drive on asphalt, but primarily serve withstand an explosion of a TM-62 or similar anti-tank mine under the track. And while the detonation of such a mine under a Soviet track would tear the track immobilizing the tank and making it an easy pray, there were cases when the Leopard track could withstand two or even three explosions, and the tank continued to move slowly in reverse to hide behind cover. So these are the things that work.

>Still, the 115-mm gun is last century, what about new challenges like FPV drones and anti-tank systems like Kornet?

Speaking of Kornets, I have a long history with them. About 5 years ago there was an idea to make an ATGM simulator. In the process we accounted for all the tricks russians use in their advertisements. And then I got my hands on a trophy Kornet. And as it turned out its magnification is only 10x and not 12x and 20x, like on export variants. The state of its optics was very sad. Even in the manual it was written that the field of view can vary between 5.5 and 8 degrees. When I asked professional optical engineers about that, they told me that the russians don’t have a standardized optical layout and the necessary amount of the lenses to make serial devices of consistent quality with 8° field of view. They use what they have on hand to make sights, resulting in inconsistent field of view. While they can play with the lenses to have the same 10x magnification, there are problems with the field of view.
If you look at statistics, the largest number of losses of armored vehicles is still artillery. Then aviation, drones and only then ground-based AT weapons. Of all the anti-tank weapons, including other tanks all the ATGM missiles, like Metises, Kornets, Fagots, Konkurses, here Kornets occupy a very small niche. In the total number of losses, it is less than 10%. Even the Russians themselves say that the quality of those missiles oftentimes is different from expectations. There is also psychological factor. They are now trying to modify Kornets to be remote-controlled and have thermals. Basically, turn it into Stuhna-P. I can see they would want to do that, since when the missile has to fly for 4km at 300 to 310 m/s, the operator is exposed for substantial amount of time. "Kornets" are not the most basic unit.

>And FPVs?

Drones are much more complicated. Why? Because this is a technology that absolutely everyone has to deal with. If beforehand we made fun of Russians for putting grills on their tanks, now we have to adapt and build similar devices in but in different configurations. There are three main ways to protect yourself from such things. The first is the timely detection and use of electronic warfare equipment, which is so powerful that it would make drones lose control, not only of the FPVs but also of other drones. The second way is to shoot them down by all possible means, which means using up ammunition. Even if you create some kind of barrage fire from a squad or platoon, you need to spend a lot of ammunition to shoot them down. And the third is the use of these so-called "visors".
The russians have begun to install anti-drone superstructures and show them at the exhibition, and the troops have even started to use Kontakt-1 dynamic protection elements on top of tanks, on superstructures. They are trying to make the most of all the opportunities they have. Sooner or later, we will probably come to the same conclusion. We will use the same kind of polyamide nets, and we will cover not only the turret, but possibly the engine and transmission. And in the war between Hamas and the IDF we have already seen on Merkava IVs the same industrially produced or ad hoc roofs over tank turrets in order to protect the tanks from drone-dropped munitions or FPV drones. The main method will probably be to saturate the army with electronic warfare equipment, and it is desirable that each tank and IFV has an individual electronic warfare device.

>How are we doing in this area? I've seen some volunteers making such systems.

We are lagging behind on a national scale. We are now creating commissions, announcing plans, and so on. We shouldn't be announcing plans, we should be throwing all our efforts into eliminating such bottlenecks in the protection of armored vehicles and SPGs, since we are taking losses from drones. These are all things that need to be resolved by the state. And here we are talking about volunteers again.

>We also recently discovered that some of the new Lancets have airburst mode, so nets aren’t a definitive answer.

Their airburst mode is the same R-30 detonator for HE effects and if this was made with an explosively formed penetrator (EFP), with could be a serious system. This is broadly similar to how it works on Javelin, where it has 2 modes and the warhead forms a jet, but could form EFP as well. With the caliber of 60 to 80 mm, such EFP could be effective at distance 10 meters, and could penetrate the 35-45 mm of top armor of a tank.

>If we talk about Lancet specifically, it’s programmed to detonate at 2 meters, at approximately 45°.

It all depends on how well trained an operator is and what tactics do they use. NLAW and some western ATGMs, when the missile detonates one meters above the target, with the first shaped charge removing ERA on top and the second one hitting the same spot. There is nothing new about this. If you modify NLAW a little, it’s possible to get an EFP, what would be affective 50 cm to 10 m above the target. It’s scary because it works at great range.

>You mentioned Kornets in terms of percentages, but in terms of FPVs, how big is their danger?

I think the danger will only continue to grow, as their number grows. If beforehand, there was a lot of missiles for the heritage Soviet ATGMs, after 2 years of intensive war, the enemy used up most of them. Also, part of them was defective, due to the expiration of the solid propellant. If the missiles sit in storage for more than 15 years without refurbishment, the solid rocket fuel starts to decompose and the motor starts to give inconstant performance. And a lot of those detonation distances depend on the velocity of the missile according to specs. Same goes for other types of missiles. It’s even worse for missiles that spent 30 years in storage. Best case, they could be put one the test right at the last moment, just to test their electronics. And the same issues apply to the warhead and launch motor. Some of the russian voenkors mentioned that out of 11 missiles, only 3 reached their target. Unlike them FPV is something that is being produced now and more of it will be produced and so will do grow the danger. Percentagewise, they make they no more than 5% now, but this is just the beginning. For now, artillery and aviation remain to be the key dangers.
But also, this continued extreme mining. If for every linear meter of a 100-150-meter-deep minefield there will is an average of 10 to 15 AT mines, this is just ludicrous. We just don’t have so many mine rollers. We just started their mass production, but not every driver will risk to advance forward and more so, have 1 or 2 mines explode under the roller and continue the advance. One has to consider the psychology here.

>But the rollers have a limited resource as well?

Yeah. Rule of thumb is that every explosion equals minus one roller wheel, of which there are 3 to 4 pre each side. With more wheels off, you start to miss some spots and there is no guaranty you haven’t missed a mine. The soviet-made KMT-7’s had special blades behind the rollers, so when the rollers got very damaged, they could be unhinged and advance could continue with blades. Unfortunately, I still haven’t seen a Ukrainian version of such system.

>We are about to receive hundreds of Leopard 1s that do not meet the requirements on the modern battlefield because of their armor. Are we going to modernize them?

The maximum we can do here is to use the Kontakt-1 and slat armor. This will not change the situation dramatically, so we will have to adjust the tactics of using the vehicles to the opportunities we have.
For example, we received an M-55S from Slovenia, which was only little better in terms of armor compared to the basic T-55. But the Israelis modernized these vehicles for the Slovenes, adding reactive armor. In terms of specs, it roughly corresponds to the Kontakt-1. And we have lost only one of those vehicle irreversibly, from an entire battalion, when an artillery shell landed on top of the turret. It could not be reconditioned as a tank, and so the it will be used to make something else.
In principle, the Leopard 1A5 can be improved to almost the same level. The fire control system is no worse. The ammunition is exactly the same, because it has the same 105 cannon. And in principle, let's think, if there is absolutely nothing in an motorized infantry brigade’s tank battalion, this is a great option. If such a brigade is given a Leopard 1A5 battalion, their situation improves drastically.

>So, we can expect reactive and slat armor, on those tanks, right?

I think so.

>But these vehicles have thin side armor, could it withstand ERA?

You know, there is this thing with Kontakt-1, where russians use an extremely primitive solution to weaken the energy of an explosion on the hull…

>But there is also Relikt?

Well, Relikt as only a nominal thing, it all depend of what kind explosives are inside. And so, when the block explodes, the tubes are compressed and they disperse the forces enough thought the hull so that they can use ERA even on BMP-3. Obviously, there are other materials that can be used here, that’s just the first thing that came to my mind. Ukraine also has similar expertise, since Microtek, developed “Raketka” ERA for lightly-armored vehicles.

>Will we ever see this project go beyond development phase?

This project was in development phase, but at least with field testing.

>The Canadian Armed Forces have ordered attachable NERA kits to enhance the Leopard 1/

NERA is something that is designed to be integrated into the main belt of armor during development, like in Leopard 2A4. This was first devised by the British with Chobham, then Burlington, then Dorchester and so on.

>Can we buy those modules from somewhere, or do we have to order them at the factory?

I think that no one ever produces such things for the warehouse, because it is quite expensive. Secondly, no one can give 100% certainty that someone will buy in 3 or 4 months. Such things are only contracted, and moreover, they may ask for a 100% advance.

>And a few words about the shells. There is a great variety of them available on the market, from practically antique ones to the ones that are able to keep up with modern requirements and even be comparable to modern 125 mm shells. We know that the best Belgian shells are able to frontally pen T-72B. What are the chances we might get them?

It all depend on the actions of the MoD and who will be doing the purchasing, as well as EU’s and NATO’s political decision-making.

>There has been public info about contacts with that Belgian firm for 105 shells, without mention of specific models. Do you think we might get the best darts?

There is always hope.

>Andriy Tarasenko (BTVT), in particular, wrote in his blog and on social media that we would not recognize Leopard 1. What does he mean by that, do you know anything about it, what kind of modernization plan could it be, perhaps something other than what you have already said?

I wouldn't like to say anything about it.

>What's going on with the Leopard 2 repair? Is something happening in Ukraine, or do we take them to Poland right away?

Repair is a complicated process. There is such a thing as an assembly repair, i.e. a broken gun. We already have tank crews that have started replacing the second gun on their T-64B tanks. And this is not a repair unit, it is a crew. They only need a crane and a different barrel. And then they do it themselves.
The situation with the Leopards is similar. When we received these vehicles, we trained not only tank crews, but also crews to repair them. That is, if nothing terrible has happened and there is no damage to the hull, no damage to the turret, and only such damage as replacing the track, replacing the roller, replacing the torsion bars, replacing the modular attachments or something inside, components, assemblies - there are no questions. This is a military repair. That is, the unit receives the components and assemblies that are needed. And somewhere in the rear of the brigade, in some place, this repair takes place.

If there is damage, especially that which is associated with armor penetration or with the effect of open fire on the armor - a internal fire for certain period of time - then it is up to the manufacturer to determine this. Or a representative of the manufacturer should determine what to do with this machine. Whether it is advisable to repair it, or whether it can be written off or used to rebuild it into some other machine that will not directly participate on the battlefield as a combat unit. Therefore, as a rule, such vehicles are taken, let's say, to the territory of our partners. And there the relevant specialists take care of these vehicles.
I think that we and our partners were smart enough to equip the repair fund not according to the Soviet standards, when there were two spare engines for a tank battalion and that was it. I think we are talking about more serious numbers. Then such repairs do not take a long time. If there are no such things in stock, then you have to wait for the allies to supply them according to the requests that have to be made.

>What about the repairability of the Leopards? We have seen a tank with an ammo explosion, but the knockout panels saved the vehicle from complete destruction.

If it's was an explosion, the repairability of this machine is absolutely…,

> The question is not how we can repair them, but rather how repairable they are.

Such a machine is not repairable. The effects of the short-term flame on internal surfaces of the turret and the hull, practically 100% of the turret.

>Can a turret replacement save this machine?

With ammo explosion, I don’t think so…

>It’s less of an explosion, but rather a cook-off/burnout.

Oh, with a cook-off, the turret need’s replacements and the damaged ones send into repair, but such things are defective, and specialists determine the feasibility of certain repairs. These are quite serious and complicated procedures. This is not as easy as it was in WWII, where there was a set of armored corks, since the shells would often just push a round piece of armor inside of impact. You take 2 armored corks, one from each side, and just weld the in place according to instruction. There instructions actually exist for T-55’s and T-62’s. It is just that I’ve never actually seen a set of those armored corks anywhere.

>In a previous interview you said that there is no difference in repair depending on the origin of the tanks: Canada, Portugal, Spain - it doesn't matter. I'm curious about Swedish tanks, is there any difference in operation, have any issues shown up?

The Swedes turned out to be quite demanding customers, and in principle, Swedish tanks are not Leopard 2A4s, but rather Leopard 2A5s. The good thing is that absolutely all vehicles were equipped with the same equipment. And if there is a different machine gun system, it is not so important. All the electronics, sights, engine, chassis, undercarriage - all this was developed by the Germans, and they produced it, or someone produced it under a German license. There are no questions here. The Spaniards have to factories and are capable on not only repainting their Leopards 2A4 but to also modernize them. And this is great.

>So, there is no difference if the tank is Canadian, Swedish or Portugese?

Only the crew can which country’s, tank they are in. There is no difference for repair crew. All details are serialized, and when they are ordering parts, they order exactly what they need.

>In your last interview, you said that in order to implement ERA on Leopard 2, you needed a decision from the designers.

We go an OK.

>You mean that such a decision was made, agreed upon and worked out together with the manufacturer?

Yes, these things happened, and some Leopard 2A4s are now, let's say, very seriously re-equipped in terms of reactive armor.

>Is this being done in Ukraine or abroad?

In Ukraine. Moreover, these kits are manufactured and delivered to the place where the unit is stationed. There, the tanks are modernized on site by a field repair team.

>Why don't Western tanks protect the turret niche? With the dominance of FPV drones, this is the first place where everyone will aim.

The problem is, how is one to protect it?

>Nets?

I think absolutely everyone will start protecting it with nets. The scheme that is being developed now protects a little more than the modernization kit that currently exists.
However, it is not possible to protect the turret niche with ERA because the armor is too thin. In addition, you wouldn’t be able hang any boxes, spare parts, tools, etc. on this niche. This is a matter of balancing the turret, and we need to explore this with the manufacturer further.

>So, we will see some more modernization of Leopard 2, am I right?

I don't think it can be called a modernization. It's more like an upgrade.

>Speaking about the use of tank in this war, what other modernizations are really needed? Maybe some sort of sensor suite, EW equipment?

Hands down, EW. This is something that is desperately needed. Next communication equipment. Then C&C and crew training, as well as all of the command structures above them.

>What do the manufactures say and how do they react?

They certainly do react. Now that our partners got understanding of where the things going, the development of the next-generation MBT is 6-8 years. They are learning from our and their mistakes, but the non-emergency updates, like the nets and ERA, the rest will take time.

>A question from viewers. Do the tanks use smoke, when drones are detected?

When we detect ATGMs or shots from an ambush, almost all the equipment has automatic smoke dispersion systems. The so-called “System 902”, where depending on the number of mortars, there is a different suffix. If the crews are trained and commanders understand where there might be trouble, those systems are being used. But the soviet system shoots smokes 200-300 meters away and any serious amounts of smoke started to be generated only some 20 to 30 seconds after firing, western equipment generally shoots smokes 50-100 meters away and smoke is generated almost instantly. They are much more effective. Moreover, there are systems that shoot HE/canister grenades from smoke mortars. And we could really use those, especially when modernizing the old soviet equipment, so that they could fire them.

>How would you assess the communication and command control on Western tanks?

You know, we received a lot of different units, different countries have different radio stations. An attempt to replace them with something uniform means replacing them with a licensed Motorola radio called K-2RB Lybid. This is not a military radio.

>So, the Leopards that came to us still have the same radios?

Well, yes.

>So, there is a problem with communication between the tanks?

No, thank God, there are no problems between the tanks. Why? First of all, the tanks in the unit are all from the same country of manufacture. If a company was equipped with vehicles from different countries, they worked accordingly to adapt this whole thing to eliminate all these problems. But the problem of communication with an infantry battalion or artillery - this is where certain problems begin.

>So, we have a tank commander who, like in 2014, climbs out of the hatch with a cell phone?

Well, thank God, it doesn't come to that now, but if we had to put our Lybid radio in addition the Western radio stations…

>As for the tank programmable munitions, do we use them?

Let's put it this way: in order to use programmable ammunition, you need to install a special programmer. Accordingly, this can only be done by those who developed this ammunition and developed the system for its use. And this will either be done during modernization here in Ukraine, which means that these vehicles must be taken off the battlefield for some time to some place…

>But only in case those munitions will be supplied to us?

Yes.

>But we have them. – So, these processes happened. – No, but you need a special gun to fire them, that is on Leopard 2A6.

This is not about the gun, but about the programmer. Such equipment can also be installed on other guns. But, in the basic version, a specific gun leaves the factory, which allows the use of specific ammunition. And guns that were produced earlier can be upgraded to this level. But this installation of additional equipment means time, certain funds, and the availability of such equipment. Therefore, if we receive, say, a batch of Leopard 2A6 vehicles that can use this ammunition, it means that this ammunition will go to this particular brigade, to this tank battalion. No questions will arise here. If we want "more", then we will have to raise the question of what we need.

>Is there any information on their use?

No info.

>What about armor-piercing ammunition for Leopard 2?

The armor-piercing ammunition that Ukraine has received from our Western allies pen absolutely all armored vehicles that appear on the battlefield at the range of effective use of the Leopard 2A4 tank's guns, i.e. at a range of 3.5-4 kilometers.

>I’ll add a remark that we got the DM53’s from Germany, and we are supposed to get DM63 next year. – Is there a need for a programmer?

No, you just need to update the ballistic computer with new data. A representative of the manufacturer has to come with a laptop.

>Also, seeing as we get tanks from different countries, do we get different shells too?

There is STANAG. And although those shells might have different names in different countries, they are de facto the same shells.

>Ok, but if we speak about say Leopard 2A5 and an old Spanish Leopard 2A4, they might not have been there to “witness” the new shells.

That why there is DM33 and DM43. And every tank has its shells specified. But these questions are resolved when units are being formed, so a platoon doesn’t have a mismatch.

>Also, you mentioned that you haven’t seen Svinets being used in battles. But I’ve heard that there have been cases where Svinets was supplied to the russian units, for instance the ones operating T-80B, but they are not adapted to shoot them.

Let’s just say that here is Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (GRAU) and then there are tankers. And they are at the opposite poles of the planet Earth. Most tankers don’t know that there are these shells. And even less of them know that these shells can be loaded only into specific autoloaders, since it’s longer.

>Wait, so GRAU doesn’t monitor where do these shells go?

Only to a certain point. Say there was this person who was taken to the factory and taught about the shells. Then it served at one unit for a few months before being transferred elsewhere. But the people assume everyone knows everything, but it’s not the case, since the continuity was broken. It’s human factor. Things like that happen to us as well.

>What shortcomings were identified in the operation of Western tanks, including Challenger?

There was only one drawback - there is not enough of them.

>How does the anomalous weight 60 tons for most western tanks manifest itself in comparison with the soviet 45-ton vehicles?

First of all. We do not use them in areas where there is such a large network of water obstacles that we need to massively build some kind of crossings for them or strengthen the bridges that exist. We don't have such places where there are battles going on.

>What about Kherson?

There aren’t that many irrigation channels. Also, it’s not the time when the water is flown through them. Moreover, the North Crimean Canal ceased to function. So, this isn’t a big concern.

>Most of our tank trawls are Soviet, as are the vehicles that pull these trawls. Can they be adapted to the new equipment?

We have received a certain number of tractors with trailers. I think there is at least one trawl to three vehicles, so it’s generally enough. But you see, they are also used to transport other heavy equipment, like SPH, that weigh more than the heaviest tanks. For instance, PzH 2000 has to be transported more often than the tanks. Good think we have enough people to plan everything, but many learn from their own mistakes.

>How did Western tanks perform on our soil, especially in Donbas?

Absolutely all armored vehicles from Western countries were designed to be used from the Arctic to the equator. For non-professionals, this might seem like problem, but you simply change the type of oils you use.

>There have been cases with Donbas soils, that a place where a T-64 passes through with ease, a T-72 with have its tracks slip off the rollers. ( https://youtu.be/W-cULvqLqDI )

This is a design flaw of the T-72. You know, the T-64 has a track design that pushes through the mud, and the rollers are narrow, so the mud does not get packed between the roller and the track.
On the T-72, the roller is wide, 3 times wider than on the T-64. And this "spot of contact" between the roller and the track is large, a lot of dirt gets stuck there, and this leads a situation where 2-3 rollers get raised. The dirt sticks more and more and more. Sooner or later, the track takes off.
Moreover, the T-64 is dragging the T-72 and T-80B through this mud, because they cannot drive themselves. https://youtu.be/O7I9OzfnNxE

>So, you haven't noticed this problem with Challenger and Leopard 2?

We have not noticed any serious problems. You have to take into account that a lot of stuck vehicles are caused by driver error. All Western vehicles have automatic transmissions that automatically adjust to the ground and, accordingly, there are less mistakes. There, the transmission corrects the mistakes of the driver, so there are far fewer such things.

>Of all there these tanks, Abrams stands out by using a gas turbine engine. Have the Abrams tanks arrived in Ukraine yet?

They are in one of the brigades. If this brigade is not yet being used on the battlefield and there is no information about it, then you understand that neither I nor anyone else can tell you where they are.

>The question is, if it’s designed to use kerosine as its primary fuel, how will it work for us? Will we have to set up new supply chair or have to switch it to diesel?

A gas turbine will work on absolutely anything, you just have it started. The soviet GTD-1000T, GTD-1000TF or GTD-1100 initially were designed to work with kerosine. But when there were some 6,000 of them, there wasn’t enough kerosine for them, these tanks started to be fueled with diesel. To get GTD-1000 and its derivatives started on diesel, you just need 150 atm of compressed air in the system. So, there are only two solutions: either we use aviation kerosine, like JP-8 or JP-10, but if we are switching to diesel, it has to be quality diesel, we need an OK from turbine manufacturer. And there will be certain restrictions regarding its lifespan, since it’s not its primary fuel. But I can’t say for sure what decision will be taken.

>The structure of a tank unit in NATO countries and in Ukraine is different - we have fewer tanks. How is a tank unit formed if it was western tanks?

When the crews were trained there, they were trained to act in pairs. Accordingly, some of the crew members and officers who were trained had combat experience as tankers, while others had no combat experience. It would be logical for the to act in pairs, as they were trained to do.
Moreover, it is still more effective, and many unit commanders, even in our brigades, those armed with T-64BV and T-80BV tanks and T-72s of various modifications, also use pairs. There are different cases. Sometimes one of the machines in platoon doesn’t work, so they have to work in pairs. Company can form 2 or 3 pairs. All depends on the situation and how their mission is formulated. But experience shows, that when one acts and other covers him, this gives positive results. There were situations where the covering crew saved the other tank from being shot at by the enemy.

>So, in practice we switched to NATO doctrine?

It’s more thought through. We are not the only ones who arrived to that conclusion. When the russians got COIN-type experience from occupation of Chechnya, their infantry switched to working in pairs and triples, with changes being impended into the doctrinal stricture of units themselves, as well as basic firearm training. Similar changes occurred in the AFU, back before the war started in 2014. This happened in the early 00’s. Tankers got the memo some decade and a half later.

>By the way, we got a lot of questions on the role of tank on modern battlefield. What does the future hold? As the practice showed, there haven’t really been any large-scale tank battles.

There hasn’t been a company vs. company engagement aside from a few cases. The largest engagement was something like 5-6 tanks on each side. This is a very rare situation. But if we think about it, the tank was originally devised to be a vehicle that could advance across the multilayered enemy defensive line with barbed wire and anti-personnel mines, since AT mines didn’t exist. And it was originally conceived as an infantry support vehicle, so there were machinegun tanks and gun tanks. But their purpose was to support infantry at the field of battle from the front or the rear, so the infantry could capture the enemy trenches. That’s what they do now, returning to tradition. But in addition to that, they are still used as field artillery. But their semidirect or indirect fire-support role has decreased, due to the nature of fighting and thanks to the fact that we got more dedicated artillery and shells. In addition to that artillery reconnaissance units got saturated with drones, so they function differently to how it’s written in manuals. Nevertheless, tanks are still used in this role, when there is nothing else available, or everything else has run out of shells. Well-trained crews come are able to shoot at 12km.

>So, is this the end of armored formations?

There probably won’t be any more pure tank formations. The biggest formation we have is an armored brigade, but it’s more of a reinforced regiment. Anything bigger is impractical. No country on Earth would be able to support them. Even the russians field a maximum of 2,400 – 2,500 tanks at the frontline, with 70% mission-capable rates. It’s impossible to fully equip the 1st Guards Tank Army and leave the rest of their armed forces with nothing. That’s why in brigades – tank battalions, in division – maybe a tank regiment or even a battalion, since there might not be enough tanks for that. If brigades are organized into a corps, there might be a tank regiment or even a brigade. Although there isn’t much difference between a tank regiment or brigade, as both have 94 tanks.

>But it’s important to note that no one fights with divisions here, just brigades.

We occasionally have 2-3 brigades given under the command of one officer to fulfil a task usually done by a battalion.

>A question about indirect fire. For that tank needs a level. Does Leopard 1 have it?

Yes, and Leopard 2 as well. It’s it a wonderful level.

On Ukrainian Armor

>With the beginning of the invasion, closer to 2023, we began to see T-72 tanks of never-before-fielded modification similar to T-72AMT.

You see, starting from 2018 we stared to work with mothballed stuff from 115th reserve base, the one near Kyiv. And when we started to look what sort of turret does it have, and whether a 1K13 sight will fit into it, and if not, what can be done to remedy this issue, like making a new hole. Afterwards, we stared to question how many sights like that do we have. Occasionally when 6-8 tanks were delivered there from the factory, there weren’t two alike. Now we start to see them.

>I’m talking more about modifications that look like they were reconditioned after the war started.

Of course.

>And they differ from modifications that were applied to them before the war. So, we are in a situation where we have to improvise?

We are definitely replacing TPN-149-23 sights with thermal imaging sights. And we have them. If it was a T-72B tank with a 1K13 sight that didn't work, and we can't restore it because we don't have any components, then we remove the 1K13 and the missile channel it might have had, and put a 2020 model TPN-1TPV instead. This way we get a tank that works day and night with equal efficiency at a range of up to 4 km.

>After modernization, do all Ukrainian tanks receive a thermal imager or an NVG?

Yes, all of them.

>And what about the T-72 Urals?

I haven’t seen more than 10 of them in the AFU and I’m not sure we have them now. There was a period when they were converted into ARVs, BTS-5U.

>The 25th brigade has Urals. And it looks like they were modernized after the invasion.

That means that they have thermals and NGV.

>Some of the T-72s have rollers from T-55s. Do we have a shortage?

At some point in time, perhaps, yes, it was evident, but our allies produce rollers. Czechs produce them for Excalibur Armor - no problem.

>So, we have a source of parts?

There are absolutely no problems with spare parts for the T-72 in Europe. Including engines - this is an engine for many vehicles and engineering equipment.

>You’ve also mentioned that some crews already replace a second barrel. Do we have any problems with that?

Let’s put it this way. There are factory-fresh guns, they are 1st category, and there are guns that made 3 shots and they are 2nd category. But it has no more than 1.5 mm of wear and it can do 700 standard shots, before reaching 3.3 mm of maximum allowed wear.

>You mean 700 APFSDS shots?

No, it’s either HE or HEAT. With APFSDS situation is different, since different shells induce different wear on the barrel. BM42 Mango, which are the most common and best shells that we and russsian have. They have to be recorded as 5 standard shots in the log. If the gun is certified to do 650 shots, one can only make 130 APFSDS shots with it, before needing replacement. But I’ve seen a barrel that had as much as 4.6 mm of wear, making it almost a 130 mm cannon.

>And what about ammo for tanks, especially sub-caliber ammunition? We know that for some time we had a shortage of high-explosive ammunition and we started making our own.

Again, the 125-millimeter caliber is used by China, Pakistan, and North Korea. There are several European countries, so it all depends on whether the parliaments of these countries allocated money for the purchase of ammunition for Ukraine in time or not. You understand, the Russo-Ukrainian war resulted in a situation, where ammunition marked and munitions price increased multifold. So, when beforehand we were promised 1 million shells, the funds that were allocated for that can buy only 500k.

>What does an average ammunition package for a Ukrainian tank look like? What kind of ammunition is it, at what proportions?

These are high-explosive fragmentation shells - 80, sometimes 90 percent. A couple of APFSDS rounds and a few HEAT rounds.

>What kind of darts do we usually use?

We have different ones. Usually it’s a few Mangos, but it could be something else as well. But I’d like to refrain from mentioning specific shells and their producers, since we often get them from third countries. So, this isn’t that big of a problem. Again, when a dart hits the upper front plate of T-72, T-80BVM, T-80B or T-90, the crew doesn’t think about advance anymore, but rather switches into a reverse gear. If there is another hit, the crew likely has concussions, even without penetration. No one waits for the second hit. And there isn’t much of a difference in regards to what hits you.

>We saw a tank battle in the Kherson oblast, when our tankers simply destroyed enemy tanks using HE shells. I talked to that tanker - he was just scared and fired what he had loaded.

That's for sure. If you already have a HE round in the breach, you will shoot. If you have nothing at all, only HE shells, you will shoot. The Hero of Ukraine, lieutenant-colonel Bozhok destroyed three enemy tanks with HE shells. (https://youtu.be/9TJeFhtNyGo [Embed])

>Another question from viewers about modernization: Is there any point to integrating 105mm L7 cannon into T-80s, T-72s and T-64s to scandalize with Leopard 1 and to increase the effective firing range.

Changing the barrel, but keeping the 2A46 breach and not changing the sights is pointless. Their sights are better, their barrels are better, their shells are better. And these 3 components give the result that the western tanks had 40 years ago. I see no point to it.

>But there is something that can be done with Leopard 1s?

Nah, but the fighting with not stop any time soon and we will continue to slowly loose our equipment. We have tanks that were already salvaged more than 3 times. But at some point, they will become irrecoverably lost. We will need to think about the future, but we have to win now.

>But this is a temporary solution not the future Ukrainian MBT?

There are certainly things that can be done with them, but we need shells and to actually receive them the quantities that we were promised and that they work. And then give them a little local makeover.

>That’s what I’m taking about this is a temporary solution, but for the future…

In the future it will probably have to be a 120 mm cannon. But we will have to cooperate with someone. We will probably need to have 1,500 – 1,800 tanks. Of them, half will be in active service and the rest in storage.

>It can be estimated that before the invasion we had approximately ~950 tanks in active service. Is it true?

Yes. Plus, we also formed 3 brigades from the tanks in reserve.

>So, what you are saying, is that we need at least the same number of tanks in storage that are in active service, for the peace-time army of 250 thousand people? Like 900 tanks there and there.

Recently there was an article in the Economist, that explained why we couldn’t. Despite having 24 brigades. But not all of them had tank battalions. To defend itself from external thread, Ukraine needs 40 brigades. For 40 brigades, even it’s 31 tank per brigade, you can see the issue. And aside from those 40 brigades, there are tank brigades.

>There are rumors that we are restoring or planning to restore the T-64A. Do you know anything about this?

I know two things. The first thing is engines, the production of 5TD engines has been lost. And the second thing is that the T-64A is equipped with a TPD-2-49 sight. There has never been such a sight in Ukraine.

>We discussed before that we can make new holes and put something different there.

But this wouldn’t be T-64A. Again, everything rests primarily on the availability of spare parts. If they are not available, what can we talk about?

>We cut up part of the T-64A fleet after the fall of the USSR?

The Soviet Union signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. And after it fell apart, all the newly independent states had to take on parts of this responsibility. Yeah, we cut. Why? Because we had restrictions on the number of tanks we could have. The treaty covered Russia up to Urals. The Russians left the treaty and Belarusians just ignore it.

>Well, Russia just shipped the equipment behind the Urals?

It’s not as simple, since there is a 300 km demilitarized zone with China, meaning that they could keep only part of the fleet in those areas. Part the equipment was shipped to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, where it was simply lost.

>So, the main reasons for T-64As not to be restored are problems with sights?

It the overall problems with components. We will not be able to restore them.

>I asked about the cut-up equipment because there should have been components left, engines?

Unfortunately, engines are made of non-ferrous metals, sight are made of non-ferrous metals, radios are non-ferrous metals and precious metals. I’ll give you a little example. Back when we were cutting up those tanks, including museum pieces like the baseline T-64s, the now dead Vadym Fedosov, asked one of the enterprises that were cutting up those tanks to sell him a few for their salvage value, so that they can be preserved as museum pieces at the tank factory. They declined, because they didn’t care.

>So, their recondition is extremely unlikely?

Yes.

>And all the photos and videos are from training unit?

From what I’ve seen only one training center had a special box where there were a few old machines to show the visitors.

>There were a few photos of them on the railway platform and a video of a working engine.

If it was 3-4 machines, that’s possible, but there is no future. Moreover, I’m not sure that anyone would be willing to risk getting inside, since there isn’t ever a ballistic computer inside.

>What is the future of the T-62 and T-55 trophy tanks? We have seen volunteers converting them into ARVs, some are even trying to make BMPTs.

I suspect that a centralized decision will be made that will probably turn all the trophy vehicles something else. We don’t have the shells and almost no one makes them. What’s the point of spending money on shells for 40 vehicles? Think about the economy.

>You suspect they will be converted into ARVs or engineering vehicles?

There aren’t many enterprises that convert them into engineering vehicles, and it’s often easier to use civilian vehicles instead.

>There is also series of questions about the future MBT and the tank building. Will it be some sort of partnership?

First, selection of the caliber. Second, domestic production of tank ammunition including chemistry, metallurgy, high-precision mechanics, including extruders. And then gun stabilizers, electronics, renewal of 6TD-2. It’s a complex development of metallurgical, chemical and machine industries. This is development of optics, electronics. If we manage to organize all of that, with state support within next 5-10 years, only 10 years after that, would we be able to produce our own tanks. If we couldn’t manage to do that, we will have to cooperate foreign manufacturers. It will be someone who is ready to invest here and be able to defend the business, since there are no guarantees that you’ll be able to make a profit.

>If we are to choose from what is available now and what we operate, what would be you pick?

In Americans agree to do what they did in Egypt, localization of production and it will be something comparable to A2 SEP3 of A3, then I’m all for it. But I’m sure this won’t happen.

>And of all other Westen tanks, only Leopard 2 is still being produced and procured by countries. The entire European continent is rearming and this is our chance to buy something at reasonable price.

>Speaking more about tank building, we still have documentation for T-80 chassis, that is still reasonably good. Is there any point trying? Or should we just buy a K2 license?

T-80B has the same armament as T-64B and there is room for maneuver. But it has gas turbine.

>We have documentation for “Oplot” that is de facto T-80UD…

It’s a slightly different thing. Oplot is no T-80UD, it’s a substantially more advanced machine, it has a different transmission, with normal reverse speed, it has a different engine. 6TD-2 is capable of doing 1,400 hp, but it’s capped at a lower setting, since the transmission just can’t handle it. They would wear off really quick at those loads. If we could make a transmission that would fit in that space and that is able to handle the full power, or at least 1100 hp, instead of 700 hp, only then would we be able to talk about a new Ukrainian MBT. But we would also have to restart production of 6TD-2s, of 120 mm guns and autoloaders for them. But for that, we will have to do a lot internal work, since the tank that was at the Turkish tender, , despite the claim that it carries 40 shells, it had only 18 shells in the turret bustle and nothing below.

>There were also claims that due to the longer turret, there engine would overheat.

These are stories for people who don’t understand those issues can be solved.

>So, basically, without changing the chassis, but with an improved turret bustle this wouldn’t be a problem…

And a new transmission too.

>Russian have been doing something similar, like project “Orel”, where they added a 7th pair of rollers, made the chassis longer and had something similar to turret bustle. Is this an option or is this barbarism?

You see, this isn’t barbarism. To solve those issues, you need practical science. But we don’t have it.

>But it’s not a problem to keep the 125 mm caliber? Keeping the carousel autoloader and just ordering the shells abroad? Bulgarians and Romanians are in NATO and have them with no problems.

The thing is, the gunpowder in those shells isn’t as energetic and in western shells. The effectiveness of those shells in lower. And if we want to keep pace with the rest of the western world, shells will become a priority. And this will be limited by the metallurgy of the barrels, since they wouldn’t be able to handle the new shells.

>Could we solve this problem via outsource? We see that with 105mm guns, that caliber is only a nominal limitation, since the shells can be improved further.

We can do that, but how much will it cost and who will be doing it.

>I just wanted to say that the countries you mentioned aren’t at war. – I’m just mentioning that you need NATO standards to be in NATO, but those countries didn’t have that trouble. We can remain with ex-soviet tech if we wanted to.

But we need to move away from them. We can keep the caliber, but we would need to change radios, EW equipment, sights, metal of the barrels, improving consistency – to grow quality-wise. But if we outsource that, who will pay for that. I’ve mentioned the approximate number of equipment we need. A modern tank with a price tag of less than $10 million is utopia. Oplot for $5 million is not gonna happen. If was the price for 2011.

>A few questions from viewers: When will the Russians feel the "tank hunger"?

What is tank hunger? Next year, the Russians will be able to pull hulls out of storage and put into service about 1,000 more units a year. This is in 2024-25. In '26, there will be no 1,000 units a year, there will probably be 800. In 27 - 600. This is despite the fact that the war will continue. And now look at the losses with this intensity of warfare.

>1,000 units a year? We once counted that they produce approximately 60 new T-90M a year. You mean to say that they are able to restore 900 tanks a year?

The Russians can bring T-90A and T-90M production up to about a hundred units a year, or it might almost cease to zero. If the supply chains get closed off, like matrixes for thermals…

>But they started to put their own matrixes there, they don’t have French ones anymore.

I know, but there is China too. And a lot of it depends on politics. And then look, they will convert about 200 T-80Bs into T-80BVMs. Another 200 or so will simply be reconditioned. And it's the same with the T-72. That is 800 units.
And the T-62 at the Chita Armored Repair Plant, or rather the Atamanov Armored Repair Plant. Well, 10, maximum 13 vehicles per month. That is, in total it is about 1000 vehicles.

>They are still constantly putting T-72Bs into service. Where are the T-72As?

The T-72A was cut up when they were implementing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Well, almost everything was cut. Moreover, a lot of the were used up at training centers, as training vehicles. When I just started serving at the training center in the Far-East, T-72As were already used for training. Next, we got T-72As with V84 engine and thermal sleeve. And then we got 6 T-72B for the entire training division. T-72 was the workhorse that you didn’t really care for using in training. We send off 20 machines a year to be repaired, from that one regiment. And the entire division had 3 training regiments…

>And because they are constantly used, their lifespan is quickly used up.

A tank like that had to be send into capital repair every 3-4 years.

>There is also talk of them restoring tank production at Omsk and starting new production of T-80s. What can you say about that? And there were also videos of them preparing to start production gas turbine engines. So, they might be able to start low serial production of the engines.

They can restore it, since they have all the necessary documentation. But it’s a question of such engine’s lifespan. You could make an engine that would run for 500 hours, in accordance to the soviet standard, or you could make an engine that would run for 150 hours. It’s also an engine. It makes sense, if you think that such tank will live a maximum of 2-3 months on the battlefield. But to field these engines long-term is economically unviable, since you’d have to send it back to the factory for capital repairs.

>These engines that are being produced, are put on the BVMs, and we got a few such trophies…

BMV’s have exclusively soviet engines in them, that have undergone capital repairs. And they have a reserve of such engines. Why? Because BVM’s 1,200 hp engines have turbo, that boost it from 1,000 hp. And you feel it. The good thing about the tank is that it has a has a different 7-speed transmission, unlike the 5-speed one, and is able to use that power.

>So, when the T-72B reserves run dry at storage yards, we will no longer see any more vehicles of this family, since the T-72As have been cut up?

A lot of T-72As have been converted into engineering equipment and such, no question about it. The other question is that, well, not all of them will be destroyed on the battlefield, some will be repaired. So, this process of running out of tanks is a long-term process. I wouldn’t want us to fight for so long.

>We shouldn’t expect them to run out of tank reserves?

Russia will definitely not run out of tanks in the next 3 years.

>Finalizing question: Future Ukrainian IFV – CV90? Maybe other vehicle? Nowadays, the difference between APCs and IFVs are fading away. Maybe Stryker?

Stryker is for light brigades. And it’s a very specific machine, maybe for a different army. I don’t think our army is quite ready to use it. It’s an entirely different information environment, constant air support, attack helicopters and so on. This is a fast vehicle, but it’s main purpose, especially for the version with .50 cal on top, is to deliver the infantry to the battlefield and to then support if from distance.

>And an infantry support vehicle? (I think they meant M1128 MGS)

This is a serious and technologically demanding equipment. It has a complicated feeding mechanism, expensive maintenance, expensive ammunition for the low-impulse gun. This is not a system for a mass army.

>There has been news about memorandum for 1,000 CV90…

Now CV90 is THE IFV. It’s an accomplished IFV. It was good protection, good armaments, wonderful transmission, a hard to kill engine. The only limit is how many we would be able to buy and at what price.

>And the production rate and delivery date.

If they’ll be paid a fair price, the manufacturer will be able scale production. And we can localize it.

>There are options and we need to chose the main variant we want. – Our future IFV, in light of drone proliferation, should it have reactive armor? What caliber of the gun should it have? 30 or 40mm? How many infantrymen should it carry? 6-8-10?

An IFV shouldn’t carry 10 people. The more reasonable number in 6, since the small arms are taking up more space and personal protection adds bulk. And with the exoskeletons likely coming into play, 6 is good number. Caliber depends on the design goals and the requirements of the Directorate for Strategic Development at the General Staff. Why? Because a 40mm cannon means airburst, substantial HE effects. Same can be done for 30mm shell but the price will be entirely different.

>57mm?

57mm is too much for an IFV. It’s more suitable for an infantry support vehicle, that is also able to provide SHORAD. For an IFV it’s between 20 and 40mm.

>Well, we got a few CV90s already and can see the difference between them and soviet 30 mm cannons. Especially with 2A42, that due to its fast rate of fire gives off a very different visual impression. One shoots really fast and the other one has a much larger caliber. From experience, what suits us better?

Again, if for soviet 30mm there were good APDS shells, that would be much better then…

>We are talking about the future IFV, and have to use that it will be NATO 30mm with corresponding shells.

Then 40mm, because ammo will be cheaper. The amount of metal delivered to target per second, if we hit the target on 1st or 2nd shot, shouldn’t be excessive.

>Well, it looks a bit different now. With a soviet cannon, it’s quite easy to slash thought a hedgerow.

It’s cool to expend 50 30mm shells to kill one combatant, but when you can accomplish the same job with one 40mm shell, I’m more inclined towards the 40mm.

>Especially if we use airburst?

Not only that, but also ballistic computer, multispectral sight with build-in rangefinder, commander being able to control the gun in duplicate mode, since he has a panoramic sight with a rangefinder, thermals, and so on and so forth. Oftentimes, a commander might see something that gunner doesn’t and vice versa. Compare that to our BMP-1s and 2s with TKN-3. They are blind.

>What about reactive armor?

Two ways here. Either ERA, which is not that great, since infantry couldn’t be nearby, or NERA, which would mean that infantry won’t try to run away. It’s a better approach.

>We already know that Swedish IFVs have very good side armor, an armored sandwich. But there has been at least one case where it didn’t save a crewmember. Could reactive armor have helped here.

I doubt reactive armor have helped on a vehicle of the same class. We don’t know what hit it.

>We actually do. Apparently, it was PG-7.

Wait a second, PG-7V, PG-7VL and PG-7VR, with tandem change. And those are very different grenades, although the launcher is the same. There is no 100% protection against modern AT weapons, even Merkava doesn’t have it.

>We’ve sure seen it. – You need a visionary idea from which you build on top.

>Thanks to mister Salamakha for his time. Although we’ve discussed much today; I hope we will be able to have another episode some time later. Thanks for you support.

#czolgi #technikawojskowa #militaria #mechanika #wojna #taktyka #ciekawostki